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TAGS: [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [NATO](#) [PINR](#) [US](#) [UP](#)  
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MOD SAYS NO MANPADS FOR COUNTERMEASURES  
DEVELOPMENT: FULL GOVERNMENT DECISION PENDING

REF: A. KYIV 210  
[B](#). KYIV 163 (NOTAL)  
[C](#). STATE 5539 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,c,d)

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. See para 3.

[1](#)2. (S) Summary: During a March 28 meeting with Ukrspetsexport and Ministry of Defense representatives, an MOD official said that in response to the U.S. request for additional MANPADS to be used for counter measures development, other than the delivery of 380 Igla and Igla-1 MANPADS missiles under a current contract, the Ukrainian military had no further Igla and Igla-1 missiles that were excess to its needs to provide to the U.S. A Ukrspetsexport representative said the company was ready to provide MANPADS missiles in any quantity and compensation level agreed to by the Ukrainian government. When we asked the MOD representative again whether this was a final GOU position, he clarified that the MOD position was still subject to a Ukrainian government inter-agency review process that would involve the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) and the Foreign Ministry. End summary.

[1](#)3. (S) Comment and Action Request: Although the Ukrainian inter-agency review process could lead to a reversal of the MOD position, we are not optimistic that the NSDC or Foreign Ministry would overrule an argument based on military operational requirements. At the next opportunity, the Ambassador will seek to confirm the MOD position with DefMin Hrytsenko, and we will also seek an appointment with Deputy Defense Minister Tereshchenko, currently ill, to discuss the issue further. We recommend however that, despite the setback, we continue to engage the Ukrainians on the possibility of further cooperation on MANPADS countermeasures development. One way to do this would be for a briefing team, presumably from the Department of Homeland Security, to visit Kyiv to describe the current USG MANPADS countermeasures development program. Request that Department advise whether this visit could take place and, if agreed, when. End comment.

[1](#)4. (U) DOD experts James Lake, Wayne Burrell, and Jose Mendez, Assistant Army Attache LTC Patrick Crabb, and poloff met with Ukrspetsexport (USE) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials March 28, per Defense Minister Hrytsenko's suggestion (ref A). USE First General Director Oleksandr Kovalenko and MOD Weapons and Advanced Technology Development and Acquisition Department Director Volodymyr Grek were the primary speakers on the Ukrainian side, which numbered about a dozen people. ADRON Research and Development Company Chief

Designer Sergei Turenko also briefed on his company's products and research and development programs.

#### Reinforcing the Message

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15. (S) We began the meeting by stressing that we were proposing that the U.S. and Ukraine cooperate to counter a common MANPADS threat. The U.S. was directing increasing efforts to find effective defenses against MANPADS, which had been used by terrorists against both military aircraft and civil aviation. We had proposed to provide a modest amount of compensation to Ukraine for the delivery of MANPADS, but the funds were promised to enable USE and MOD to avoid time-consuming procedures to overcome the absence of any legal foundation for transfers of MANPADS (or any MOD-owned equipment) at no cost. We were willing to brief Ukrainian government officials regarding U.S. MANPADS countermeasures efforts and to share some of our data. Lake said the U.S. had a continuing need for the Igla (SA-18) and Igla-1 (SA-16) MANPADS missiles for a variety of countermeasures development efforts. He and his colleagues were ready to discuss details of the contract process and the logistics of MANPADS transportation.

#### USE's Position

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16. (S) Kovalenko said USE could work out the procedures for a transfer of MANPADS, but the MANPADS missiles that it might supply were property of the Ukrainian government, and specifically MOD. USE was ready to facilitate any MOD and Ukrainian government decision. USE officials fully understood the security threat that MANPADS posed and the importance of developing defenses against them. He stressed,

as later did Grek, that, in recent years, USE has transferred Igla and Igla-1 MANPADS missiles only to the U.S. Kovalenko did not see any fundamental obstacles to the U.S. request for 1,000 Igla-1 and 500 Igla missiles. USE already had an open contract, with all the necessary approvals received, to supply 120 Igla-1 and 260 Igla missiles to the "U.S. Army." USE was prepared to execute on the contract "immediately" to deliver the total 380 missiles. After the introductory remarks, Kovalenko turned the floor to Grek, excused himself, and left the conference room.

#### MOD's Reply

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17. (C) Grek took a markedly different tack when he next spoke. After DefMin Hrytsenko had instructed him to participate in the meeting, Grek met March 14 with First Deputy Defense Minister Polyakov. Polyakov had said MOD would help to expedite the transfer of the 380 MANPADS missiles under the existing contract. While the MOD leadership understood the importance of the MANPADS threat, MOD was not in a position to transfer any additional Igla and Igla-1 missiles to the U.S. once the existing contract was fulfilled. The Ukrainian military continued to require such MANPADS missiles for force protection for peacekeeping and other operations and, unfortunately, no replacements for the Igla and Igla-1 were under development or planned for procurement. In fact, existing stocks of the missiles were insufficient for Ukrainian military needs. Deliveries of Strela MANPADS missiles were still a possibility.

18. (C) At the end of the meeting, we requested clarification of Grek's statement. Did he mean to say the Ukrainian government was rejecting the USG offer for cooperation on MANPADS countermeasures? Grek seemed caught off-guard by the blunt question, but then said his stated position was the MOD position. MOD still needed to consult with Foreign Ministry (MFA) and the National Security and Defense Council, first at the staff level. The NSDC Secretariat might elect to put the issue on the agenda of the next NSDC meeting, chaired by President Yushchenko (and including Prime Minister Yushchenko) and due to be held next in April. Grek

acknowledged that there were political and economic factors that might outweigh the MOD's military operational argument.

#### ADROS Presentation

¶9. (U) Grek said MOD was also undertaking efforts to develop electronic equipment to protect military and civilian aircraft against MANPADS. DefMin Hrytsenko had ordered the installation of such a system on Ukrainian military helicopters after the Ukrainian military had verified the defensive system's effectiveness. The company that developed the system was prepared to carry out joint development programs with the U.S. DOD to develop MANPADS countermeasures. Grek introduced Turenko and invited him to speak.

¶10. (U) Turenko said ADRON was engaged in several efforts in the field of MANPADS countermeasures, including the development of equipment to decrease the infra-red visibility of aircraft, to detect and locate missile launches, and to protect aircraft against small-arms fire. His company's KT-01AV ADROS system was designed to defend against MANPADS and air-to-air missiles, such as the SIDEWINDER, that use infra-red guidance. The system was a single-unit device that mounted easily and weighed 26 kilograms. The ADRON worked against guidance systems that were amplitude, frequency, and pulse modulated. It operated continuously from take-off to landing and protected against several missiles simultaneously. ADROS had an operational effectiveness rate of 80 percent, based on field testing of the system.

#### The Way Forward

¶11. (C) After we expressed our disappointment at Grek's news, he said that he did not want to say that bilateral discussions had ended. A final answer on the U.S. proposal would have to be provided by the appropriate official after full consideration. (Note: We will also raise this issue with senior MOD leadership to ensure to confirm Grek's statements made to the team. End Note.) We said that, despite this setback, we would recommend that the U.S. continue to engage and cooperate with Ukraine on possible joint development of MANPADS countermeasures. A briefing

team could possibly visit Kyiv to describe U.S. efforts to develop MANPADS countermeasures in greater detail. The Department of Homeland Security might be particularly interested in ADRON's progress in detecting and locating missile launches. Grek welcomed the possibility of future briefings and noted that, if the briefing team were interested, a visit could be arranged to ADRON's production facility.

¶12. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:  
[www.state.gov/p/eur/kiev](http://www.state.gov/p/eur/kiev).  
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